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INTRODUCTION
In October 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
revealed that various state-based election systems were breached
prior to Election Day.1 In a postelection audit, seventeen United
States intelligence agencies agreed that Russian hackers perpe-
trated the breach.2 Later, a leaked National Security Agency (NSA)
document demonstrated that the Russian government also directed
a spear-phishing3 attack against a third-party American voting ma-
chine company.4 Ultimately, a DHS official testified that twenty-one
states’ election systems were targeted prior to the 2016 election,5
but independent reporting suggests that the breach extended to a
total of thirty-nine states.6
1. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence
on Election Sec. (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-
department-homeland-security-and-office-director-national [https://perma.cc/86LD-9MF8]
[hereinafter DHS on Election Security].
2. See INTELLIGENCE CMTY. ASSESSMENT, ICA 2017-01D, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES
AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS, at ii (2017), https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/3254239-Russia-Hacking-report.pdf [https://perma.cc.V2RP-K4TN]; UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, Intelligence Careers, https://www.intelligencecareers.gov/
icmembers.html [https://perma.cc/MEB2-K6B9] (explaining how seventeen separate orga-
nizations form the United States Intelligence community).
3. A spear-phishing hack is a targeted cyberattack perpetrated via email. Kim Zetter,
Hacker Lexicon: What Is Phishing?, WIRED (Apr. 7, 2015, 6:09 PM), https://www.wired.com/
2015/04/hacker-lexicon-spear-phishing/ [https://perma.cc/5TJJ-BZ7R]. The email appears to
originate from someone the victim knows and pertains to the victim’s interests or occupation.
Id. If the victim opens the email, the hack is completed when the victim clicks on something
within the email—such as a hyperlink or an attachment—encrypted with a virus. Id. 
4. Matthew Cole et al., Top-Secret NSA Report Details Russian Hacking Effort Days
Before 2016 Election, INTERCEPT (June 5, 2017, 3:44 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/06/05/
top-secret-nsa-report-details-russian-hacking-effort-days-before-2016-election/ [https://perma.
cc/FK6M-CHYK].
5. Matt Zapotosky & Karoun Demirjian, Homeland Security Official: Russian
Government Actors Tried to Hack Election Systems in 21 States, WASH. POST (June 21, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/homeland-security-official-russian-
government-actors-potentially-tried-to-hack-election-systems-in-21-states/2017/06/21/33bf
31d4-5686-11e7-ba90-f5875b7d1876_story.html?utm_term=97c5fab34d90 [https://perma.cc/
5T5D-3FX5].
6. Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, Russian Hacks on U.S. Voting System Wider than
Previously Known, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-06-13/russian-breach-of-39-states-threatens-future-u-s-elections [https://perma.
cc/VWS6-PKHL]. The breach pertaining to the 2016 election will be explained at greater
length in Part II.A.
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In July 2017, one in four American voters said they would consid-
er not voting in upcoming elections due to cybersecurity concerns.7
In response, various legislators and interest groups presented ideas
and plans to fix gaps in election cybersecurity.8 But these reforms
were offered well after many election administration and cyberse-
curity experts had already expected America’s aging election sys-
tems to fail.9
Although many agree that America’s election cybersecurity needs
an overhaul,10 there is disagreement as to how far Congress may go
to require these changes. The United States Constitution delegates
much of Congress’s authority in this area to the states through the
Elections Clause: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators.”11
This Note recognizes that the Elections Clause grants Congress
the authority to regulate states’ election procedures,12 and therefore
it does not question Congress’s power to regulate states’ cyber-
security procedures in elections. Rather, this Note explores the
boundary of Congress’s authority; specifically, whether Congress
can enact legislation that permits federal oversight onto specific
states and not others.
7. CARBON BLACK, ELECTION (IN) SECURITY 5 (2017), https://www.carbonblack.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/ElectionInSecurity_Carbon_Black_July2017_Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NY6F-9KGU].
8. See, e.g., Securing America's Voting Equipment (SAVE) Act of 2017, S. 2035, 115th
Cong. (2017); Protecting the American Process for Election Results (PAPER) Act, H.R. 3751,
115th Cong. (2017); DANIELLE ROOT & LIZ KENNEDY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 9 SOLUTIONS TO
SECURE AMERICA’S ELECTIONS 2-3 (2017), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/
2017/08/15140845/ElectionSecurity-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EWP-T76Q]; Letter from Nat’l
Election Def. Coal. to Cong. (June 21, 2017), https://www.electiondefense.org/election-
integrity-expert-letter/ [https://perma.cc/2QHR-9PY4].
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See, e.g., LAWRENCE NORDEN & CHRISTOPHER FAMIGHETTI, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
AMERICA’S VOTING MACHINES AT RISK 6-7 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/publications/Americas_Voting_Machines_At_Risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4HY-XH
DW].
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 231-33.
1982 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1979
 To determine the extent to which Congress has the authority to
target certain states with election cybersecurity oversight, this Note
compares the present issue with one that the Court debated over
fifty years ago.13 In 1965, Congress implemented the Voting Rights
Act (VRA), an election administration reform bill targeted at states
that denied African Americans the right to vote.14 This Note il-
lustrates a parallel between how states failed to ensure African
Americans access to the ballot prior to the VRA15 and how states
failed to establish secure elections.16 The analogy demonstrates that
Congress can force states with obsolete election cybersecurity sys-
tems to submit to federal cybersecurity audits just as Congress
enacted the VRA to force states with a history of race-based voter
disenfranchisement to preclear any election changes through federal
oversight.17 Although these situations differ in that one concerns
voter access to the polls and the other involves election cyber-
security, a comparison is helpful because both test the extent to
which the federal government may oversee specific states’ election
administration procedures.
The federal election cybersecurity audit is a concept based on
several proposals and reports published after the 2016 election.18
The Election Infrastructure and Security Act of 2017, a bill propos-
ed in the 115th Congress, “require[d that] the voting systems used
in elections for Federal office ... comply with national standards
developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
15. Election administration procedures such as strict voter identification, voter list
purges, and polling station closures still present barriers to minority voters. See Danielle Root
& Adam Barclay, Voter Suppression During the 2018 Midterm Elections, CTR. FOR AM. PROG-
RESS ¶¶ 2-9, 5-8 (Nov. 20, 2018, 9:03 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democra
cy/reports/2018/11/20/461296/voter-suppression-2018-midterm-elections/ [https://perma.cc/
9JU6-DFYL]. Although this Note acknowledges that race-based voter disenfranchisement is
still an issue today, it focuses on those barriers which led to Congress enacting the VRA to
serve its analogy.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra notes 21-23. This Note does not advocate a specific policy, but instead
highlights those ideas suggested since the 2016 election and repackages them to create a
hypothetical that can be compared to the VRA.
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[(NIST)].”19 If Congress adopted legislation like this to establish a
threshold standard, then it could further enforce those standards
through a coverage formula—similar to the VRA’s—that triggers
federal oversight of noncompliant jurisdictions.20 DHS or NIST of-
ficials could serve as auditors because both agencies share exper-
tise in election cybersecurity.21 The audits could be modeled after
any of the eight election cybersecurity assessments that DHS al-
ready offers,22 or the eighty-eight “best practices” suggested by the
Center for Internet Security.23 The audits would identify weak-
nesses in the states’ election systems and oversee updates to cyber-
security vulnerabilities.24
In Part I, this Note details the history of African American voter
disenfranchisement, focusing on the period between the Civil War
and the Civil Rights Movement. Studying this period demonstrates
how states failed to ensure African Americans access to the ballot,
thereby providing Congress the authority to intervene through the
VRA. Part II explains the cybersecurity breach that occurred dur-
ing the 2016 election cycle, outlines how state-based voter registra-
tion databases and voting machines are outdated and susceptible to
hackers, and details how states have responded since 2016. Part III
reviews the Supreme Court’s decision in South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach, which upheld the VRA and found that Congress could focus
federal oversight onto certain states due to “unique circumstances.”25
This Part then analogizes Katzenbach’s legal reasoning to the
19. Election Infrastructure and Security Promotion Act of 2017, H.R. 1907, 115th Cong.
(2017).
20. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 437, 438.
21. See Hande Guven, Can NIST Be the Savior of Federal Cybersecurity?, NEW AM. (Aug.
10, 2017), https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/c2b/c2b-log/can-nist-be-savior-
federal-cybersecurity/ [https://perma.cc/6LDA-HKN7].
22. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS CYBERSECURITY SERVICES CATALOG FOR ELECTION
INFRASTRUCTURE 5-11 (2018), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/DHS_Cybersecurity_Services_
Catalog_for_Election_Infrastructure.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7XL-YYFH].
23. CTR. FOR INTERNET SEC., A HANDBOOK FOR ELECTIONS INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 35-
66 (2018), https://www.cisecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CIS-Elections-eBook-15-
Feb.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6QL-R8D5].
24. Identical bills were submitted in both houses of the 115th Congress to provide for such
audits, but those bills incentivized states to request federal auditors in exchange for federal
funds that had to be spent on local election systems. See Helping State and Local
Governments Prevent Cyber Attacks (HACK) Act, S. 1510, 115th Cong. (2017); S. Amend. 656
to H.R. 2810, 115th Cong. (2017).
25. 383 U.S. 301, 334-35, 337 (1966) (emphasis added).
1984 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1979
cybersecurity context to explain why Congress has the authority to
force states that fail to meet minimum election security standards
to submit to federal cybersecurity audits. Finally, Part III also ac-
knowledges some challenges to this analogy—such as whether the
analogy is consistent with Shelby County v. Holder,26 and whether
a valid analogy requires malfeasance in both circumstances—and
then responds to those critiques.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN DISENFRANCHISEMENT
AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
Although the United States federal government never explicitly
denied the right to vote based on race, African Americans have
struggled to gain equal access to the ballot box.27
In early, postcolonial America, free African Americans could vote
in most states.28 But by the early 1800s, most African Americans
were disqualified through voting eligibility requirements such as
race, sex, slavery, or property ownership.29 Southern slaves were
eventually freed through the Emancipation Proclamation,30 but
slavery was not abolished throughout the Union until after the Civil
War.31 This created a problem: what rights did newly freed persons
hold? Specifically, could they vote?
This Part summarizes African Americans’ struggle to achieve ac-
cess to the ballot box after the Civil War and details how the federal
government justified its intervention to assist in that effort. First,
Part I.A reviews the Reconstruction Era’s initial success, but ul-
timate failure, in securing African Americans the ability to vote.
Next, Part I.B studies how the Civil Rights Movement’s incremental
accomplishments led to federal government intervention to end
26. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
27. See James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM.& MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 469-70 (1999).
28. See id. at 469 n.125.
29. See Xi Wang, Building African American Voting Rights in the Nineteenth Century, in
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: SECURING THE BALLOT 1, 2-3 (Richard M. Valelly ed., 2006); Tucker,
supra note 27, at 471 (“By 1865, most states limited suffrage to white males. Only two of the
thirty-six states then in the Union, Maine and Vermont, never had imposed any legal limits
on the suffrage of blacks.” (internal citations omitted)).
30. Emancipation Proclamation, Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863).
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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African American disenfranchisement. Finally, Part I.C briefly ex-
plains how Congress enacted the VRA and examines the VRA’s
underlying authority.
A. African American Suffrage in the Reconstruction Era
During the Reconstruction Era, Republicans intended to address
many fundamental issues stemming from slavery—specifically new-
ly freed slaves’ voting rights.32 President Abraham Lincoln’s Recon-
struction plan included a measure to “control postwar politics and
administration.”33 This strategy repackaged the Civil War’s “Iron-
clad Test Oath” to guarantee that Reconstruction would be managed
by those who intended to incorporate the newly freed slaves into
American society.34
But when President Andrew Johnson assumed Reconstruction’s
management, he did not follow President Lincoln’s plan.35 Instead,
President Johnson pardoned those who perpetrated the Southern
rebellion.36 This action allowed the South to elect anti-secessionist
representatives and govern itself without oversight.37 President
Johnson’s pardon allowed several former slave states to enact the
Black Codes, a series of laws that “sought to circumvent the Thir-
teenth Amendment and replace the individual slave holder with
the state as master of this servant race.”38
32. See Eric Foner, Remarks at the Conference on the Second Founding (Nov. 14, 2008),
in 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1289, 1291-92, 1294 (2009).
33. RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK
ENFRANCHISEMENT 26 (2004).
34. See ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 86 (2d ed. 2015); VALELLY,
supra note 33, at 26.
35. See VALELLY, supra note 33, at 26-27.
36. See id. at 27.
37. See FONER, supra note 34, at 91-92.
38. Michael P. O’Connor, Time Out of Mind: Our Collective Amnesia About the History of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 93 KY. L.J. 659, 685 (2004). Mississippi and South
Carolina are often cited as the States with the most egregious examples of Black Codes. See,
e.g., FONER, supra note 34, at 93-95. But it is important to note that the Black Codes were a
problem beyond the former Confederate states. See W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION
IN AMERICA 564 (1992).
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Because states failed to ensure African Africans’ access to the
ballot,39 Congress enacted the Reconstruction Acts of 1867,40 which
established a military presence in the South.41 Federal intervention
advocates drafted this legislation to protect African Americans
from former slaveholders.42 While these military forces served
many roles, they were specifically tasked with protecting the right
to vote.43 Shortly thereafter, Congress further protected African
American suffrage through new constitutional amendments. The
Fourteenth Amendment provided Congress the authority to make
laws that could safeguard rights such as suffrage,44 and the Fif-
teenth Amendment ensured that no law could disenfranchise an
otherwise eligible voter based on his or her race.45
The federal government’s military occupation briefly succeeded
in registering African Americans to vote46 and propelled African
Americans into powerful political positions,47 but pre-Civil War
power dynamics returned after military withdrawal in 1876.48
Military withdrawal had two significant effects on African
American suffrage. First, when the southern states49 reacquired
39. See FONER, supra note 34, at 86.
40. See Military Reconstruction Acts, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867), ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867),
ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14 (1867); Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867); Command of the
Army Act, ch. 170, 14 Stat. 485, 486-87 (1867); Local Prejudice Act, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558
(1867).
41. See VALELLY, supra note 33, at 31-32.
42. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thaddeus
Stevens) (“We have turned, or are about to turn, loose four million slaves without a hut to
shelter them or a cent in their pockets.... [I]f we leave them to the legislation of their late
masters, we had better have left them in bondage.”).
43. See VALELLY, supra note 33, at 31.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. But see STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS
IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969, at 3-4 (1976) (arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment is a weak
result of compromise that “did not confer the suffrage on anybody”).
46. See VALELLY, supra note 33, at 33.
47. African Americans were elected to local, state, and federal government positions
throughout the South in the 1870s. See FONER, supra note 34, at 150-52. Overall, African
Americans were most successful in South Carolina, where they controlled majorities in both
state legislative houses by 1874. Id. at 151.
48. See VALELLY, supra note 33, at 47-49.
49. It is unfair to characterize this problem as cleanly divided between the North and the
South because institutional racism also existed in former Union states. See, e.g., id. at 124
(explaining how Maryland Democrats attempted to disenfranchise African American voters).
However, this Note highlights the role that southern states played in minority voters’
suppression because they were the states that challenged the VRA’s coverage formula. See
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sovereignty, they ratified new state constitutions that structural-
ly disenfranchised African Americans.50 For example, Mississippi
drafted a new constitution in 1890 that included a literacy test, poll
tax, and good moral character test.51 Mississippi’s 1890 constitution
was promulgated without submission to the public, whereas the
state’s 1868 constitution was subject to the voters’ approval.52 This
systematic approach to exclude African Americans is further demon-
strated through a widely used practice known as the grandfather
clause. Although there were various iterations, a grandfather clause
generally guaranteed voter eligibility to any person who could trace
their lineage to an eligible voter before a specific date.53 The cutoff
typically required that a person’s ancestor be able to vote during a
period when African Americans could not vote.54 Thus, grandfather
clauses “came to represent all that was foul about southern disen-
franchisement.55 Southern states also implemented direct primary
systems in the 1890s, which effectively organized White Democrats
behind one candidate and blocked African American influence over
the general election’s outcome.56
Second, without a military presence, violence against African
Americans raged in the South.57 The Democratic Party encouraged
this viciousness to depress African American voter participation.58
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 n.2 (1966).
50. See VALELLY, supra note 33, at 124-26 (summarizing how Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas structurally disenfranchised
African Americans).
51. See Gabriel J. Chin, Rehabilitating Unconstitutional Statutes: An Analysis of Cotton
v. Fordice, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 421, 441 (2002) (quoting Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push,
Inc. v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 1991)).
52. See ROBERT L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 203 (2d ed.
2006).
53. See R. VOLNEY RISER, DENYING DISENFRANCHISEMENT 49-56 (2010) (cataloguing
examples from Massachusetts to Alabama).
54. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 90 (rev. ed. 2009).
55. See RISER, supra note 53, at 49.
56. See id. at 13; VALELLY, supra note 33, at 156-57.
57. See DU BOIS, supra note 38, at 674-684; FONER, supra note 34, at 184-91.
58. See DU BOIS, supra note 38, at 483 (“Organized clubs of masked, armed men, formed
as recommended by the central Democratic committee, rode through the country at night,
marking their course by the whipping, shooting, wounding, maiming, mutilation, and murder
of women, children, and defenceless men.... Crimes like these ... were the means ... to elect a
President of the United States.” (citation omitted)).
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In 1868, secret Democratic Party organizations such as the Knights
of the White Camellia, The Innocents, and the Ku Klux Klan (the
Klan) marched nightly throughout Louisiana.59 Over 2000 people
were killed or wounded in Louisiana shortly before the 1868 elec-
tion.60
The structural barriers and rampant violence curbed African
American voter turnout: out of the approximately 21,000 New
Orleans Republicans, only 276 voted,61 and in St. Landry, no votes
were cast for the Republican presidential candidate even though
Republicans outnumbered Democrats in the parish by over 1000
registrants.62
The Reconstruction Era started with the potential to integrate
African Americans into the democratic system after ending slavery,
but the states failed to ensure African Americans’ access to the
ballot.63 Although the Constitution now guaranteed that suffrage
could not be denied based on race, African Americans had to over-
come racially motivated, state-imposed hurdles such as poll taxes,
literacy tests, and grandfather clauses to vote.64 However, African
Americans responded to the states’ subservient treatment with a
social movement that led to the federal government restoring Af-
rican Americans’ access to the ballot.
B. The Civil Rights Movement and the VRA
The United States underwent significant changes during the first
half of the twentieth century that led to the Civil Rights Movement.
In 1920, women were guaranteed the right to vote via constitutional
59. See id. at 474.
60. Id. at 681. These crowds were seen marching with shotguns and pistols. H.R. MISC.
DOC. NO. 154, at 9 (1869). Firearms were so popular in the weeks leading up to the 1868
election that merchants were selling Colt revolvers at twice the normal purchase price. Id. at
10.
61. See DU BOIS, supra note 38, at 474.
62. See id. at 681 (“Here occurred one of the bloodiest riots on record, in which the Ku
Klux killed and wounded over 200 Republicans, hunting and chasing them for two days and
nights through fields and swamps. Thirteen captives were taken from the jail and shot. A pile
of twenty-five dead bodies were found half-buried in the woods.”).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34, 48-62.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 45, 50-55.
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amendment.65 Although African American women were now eligible
to vote, they faced the same voting barriers obstructing African
American men.66 Later, during the Great Depression, African Amer-
icans pressured President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal to in-
clude programs that specifically assisted poor African Americans.67
These programs served all Americans equally, which in turn pro-
vided African Americans a reason to reconsider the Democratic
Party as viable political leadership.68 Meanwhile, the Supreme
Court slowly dismantled its “separate but equal” doctrine and at-
tempted to desegregate public schools.69 This brought race back to
the forefront of America’s consciousness.
America continued to change with the Civil Rights Movement in
the 1950s. The Movement was a response to the racial tension
plaguing American society.70 While efforts initially addressed de-
segregation, “the right to vote ... was always at the heart of the
[C]ivil [R]ights [M]ovement.”71
The Movement revived post-Reconstruction Era violence and
voter intimidation in the South. In 1961, Commissioner of Public
Safety Eugene Connor refused to protect the Freedom Riders while
Klansmen beat the activists in Birmingham, Alabama.72 In 1964,
three young men were murdered while trying to register voters in
an area of Mississippi that was controlled by the White Citizens’
Council and the Klan.73 In 1965, Sheriff Jim Clark beat and arrested
Ms. Annie Lee Cooper as she waited in line to register to vote in
Selma, Alabama.74 It became clear that the Civil Rights Movement
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
66. See ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
VOTE: 1850-1920, at 146-48 (1998).
67. See Harvard Sitkoff, The New Deal and Race Relations, in FIFTY YEARS LATER: THE
NEW DEAL EVALUATED 93, 96-101 (Harvard Sitkoff ed., 1985).
68. Id. at 93.
69. See Linda S. Greene, From Brown to Grutter, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3-7 (2004).
70. See KEYSSAR, supra note 54, at 206.
71. See id.
72. JULIAN E. ZELIZER, THE FIERCE URGENCY OF NOW: LYNDON JOHNSON, CONGRESS, AND
THE BATTLE FOR THE GREAT SOCIETY 30 (2015).
73. See ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS
IN AMERICA 121-22 (2015).
74. John Herbers, Woman Punches Alabama Sherriff, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1965, at 1,
PROQUEST, Doc. No. 116675179.
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could not rely on local authorities to end state-based discrimination,
and it therefore needed the federal government’s support.75
Although the federal government sympathized with civil rights
activists, it was slow to act due to the Southern Democrats’ power
and the Republican Party’s internal identity crisis.76 Over a seven-
year span, the federal government enacted three different pieces of
civil rights legislation that included voting rights reform.77 But
critics argued that the legislation inadequately safeguarded African
Americans’ ability to access the ballot.78 Although 1964 represented
the highest African American voter turnout ever recorded in the
South during a presidential election, nearly 57 percent of African
Americans were still not registered to vote.79 The difference in reg-
istration rates between African American and White voters during
the 1964 election was staggering: 77 percent White compared to
31 percent African American in Louisiana, 66 percent compared to
19 percent in Alabama, and 66 percent compared to 6 percent in
Mississippi.80 State-implemented discriminatory voting devices,
75. See KEYSSAR, supra note 54, at 207. 
76. See id. at 207-08 (explaining that Southern Democrats wielded power in Congress,
while Republicans debated whether to appeal to southern White voters or abandon their
traditional civil rights platform).
77. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 101(a)(2)(A), 801, 78 Stat. 241, 241,
266 (1964) (requiring that voting rules and procedures be applied equally to all races and that
certain registration and voting statistics be supplied to the Civil Rights Commission); Civil
Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, §§ 301, 401, 601, 74 Stat. 86, 88-90 (1960) (addressing
federal election record maintenance, criminalizing denial to vote based on race, and extending
the Civil Rights Commission’s authority); Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315,
§§ 101(a)-(e), 111, 131(a)-(c), 71 Stat. 634, 634, 637 (1957) (establishing the Civil Rights
Commission, elevating the authority of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, and
providing the Attorney General prosecutorial authority in voting rights cases). This legislation
marked the start of a new era. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 was the first civil rights legis-
lation that the federal government had enacted since the Reconstruction Era, and it was the
first civil rights bill that the Senate voted on in the twentieth century. See KEYSSAR, supra
note 54, at 208; LAWSON, supra note 45, at 199. 
78. KEYSSAR, supra note 54, at 208-10; LAWSON, supra note 45, at 246-49, 299; GARY MAY,
BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 96-97 (2013). 
79. See ZELIZER, supra note 72, at 203. 
80. See Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Judiciary
Comm., 89th Cong. app. at 32 (1965) [hereinafter Voting Rights House Hearings] (statement
of Nicholas Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the U.S.).
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such as literacy tests and good moral character tests, still obstructed
African American voters.81
The Civil Rights Movement focused its efforts on race-based voter
discrimination through public demonstrations in Selma.82 The
organizers chose Selma because the city epitomized the African
American voting experience in 1964: “[While 57] percent of the
population was African American[,] about 99 percent of the voters
were white.”83 The protests continuously succeeded in drawing
national attention to their cause and culminated in the Selma-
Montgomery March.84 This demonstration, which later became
known as Bloody Sunday, erupted in police violence against civil
rights activists.85 Even in light of the federal government’s recent
attempts to address race-based voter discrimination, the violence on
Bloody Sunday convinced federal legislators to take further action
where the states had repeatedly failed.86
The Civil Rights Movement seized the federal government’s
attention and succeeded in obtaining federal orders to desegregate
public accommodations.87 However, even with these victories, Af-
rican Americans were still unable to equally access the ballot box.88
To remedy this continued problem, Congress passed a voting rights
overhaul bill that provided an intricate solution to African American
disenfranchisement.
C. The VRA’s Enactment and Authority 
President Lyndon B. Johnson used his landslide victory in 1964
to move quickly on civil rights legislation.89 Prior to his inaugura-
tion, President Johnson directed Nicholas Katzenbach, his future
81. See id. at 30.
82. See ZELIZER, supra note 72, at 205. 
83. MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE FIGHT TO VOTE 147 (2016). 
84. See id. at 148.
85. See Roy Reed, Alabama Police Use Gas and Clubs to Rout Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
8, 1965, at 1, PROQUEST, Doc. No. 116803419 (describing how state troopers attacked civil
rights protestors after the protestors crossed the Edmund Pettus Bridge).
86. See WALDMAN, supra note 83, at 152-58.
87. See MAY, supra note 78, at 97.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
89. See ZELIZER, supra note 72, at 159, 161-62.
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Attorney General, to draft a voting rights bill90 to secure African
Americans the ballot.91 Since President Johnson acted early in his
term to address other important civil rights issues, he needed to
wait for political cover to address African American voters.92
Three days after Bloody Sunday, President Johnson introduced
his voting rights bill to Congress.93 Congressional supporters
praised the bill, noting that this legislation would finally guarantee
African Americans the right to vote after recent attempts had
failed.94 After examining95 and debating the bill,96 the legislature
overwhelmingly passed the bill through both houses.97 President
Johnson signed this bill, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, into law on
August 6, 1965.98
At its outset, Congress framed the VRA as federal action to
“enforce the [F]ifteenth [A]mendment.”99 But before the Fifteenth
90. See MAY, supra note 78, at 95-99.
91. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., President Johnson's Special Message to the
Congress: The American Promise, Address Before the Joint Session of Congress (Mar. 15,
1965) (transcript available at http://www.lbjlibrary.org/lyndon-baines-johnson/speeches-films/
president-johnsons-special-message-to-the-congress-the-american-promise/ [https://perma.cc/
58ZD-Q4MJ]) (“This bill will strike down restrictions to voting in all elections—Federal, State,
and local—which have been used to deny Negroes the right to vote. This bill will establish a
simple, uniform standard which cannot be used, however ingenious the effort, to flout our
Constitution. It will provide for citizens to be registered by officials of the United States
Government if the State officials refuse to register them. It will eliminate tedious,
unnecessary lawsuits which delay the right to vote. Finally, this legislation will ensure that
properly registered individuals are not prohibited from voting.”).
92. See Zelizer, supra note 72, at 204.
93. See S. 1564, 89th Cong. (1965); H.R. 6400, 89th Cong. (1965).
94. E.g., S. REP. NO. 89-162, pt. 3, at 2 (1965) (“Three times within the past 8 years the
Congress has attempted to secure the constitutional right to vote free from racial
discrimination. Those attempts have not been successful.”); H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 9 (1965)
(“What has been the effect of the 1957, 1960, and 1964 voting rights statutes? Although these
laws were intended to supply strong and effective remedies, their enforcement has
encountered serious obstacles.”).
95. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives spent nine days interviewing
witnesses about the bill in their respective committees. See Voting Rights: Hearings on S.
1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. (1965) [hereinafter Voting Rights
Senate Hearings]; Voting Rights House Hearings, supra note 80.
96. See MAY, supra note 78, at 154-57, 164, 166-67.
97. S. 1564, 89th Cong., 111 CONG. REC. 19,200-01 (1965) (passing the House of
Representatives 328-74); S. 1564, 89th Cong., 111 CONG. REC. 19,374, 19,378 (1965) (passing
the Senate 79-18).
98. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
99. See id. The VRA’s original language even parallels the Fifteenth Amendment.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
2019] TRUSTING THE FEDERALISM PROCESS 1993
Amendment could be enforced, Congress had to identify which
states had failed to secure African Americans access to the ballot.
The VRA implemented the following formula to identify where en-
forcement should be focused: states or political subdivisions that
used voting devices100 and fewer than 50 percent of adults were
registered to vote, or voted, in 1964.101 After the formula identified
those states and political subdivisions, all tests or devices applicable
to federal, state, and local elections used in those areas were
suspended “[t]o assure that the right ... to vote [was] not denied or
abridged on account of race or color.”102 Once the VRA covered a
state or political subdivision, the Attorney General or the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia was required to
preclear all future voting practices in those jurisdictions.103 The
preclearance requirement ensured that any new election procedures
would not result in “denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race.”104
The VRA also empowered the Attorney General to send federal
examiners to the covered states and political subdivisions.105 When
the Attorney General assigned federal examiners to a covered ju-
risdiction, the federal examiners were mandated to review voter
qualifications106 and register voters,107 as well as remove ineligible
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”), with Voting Rights Act § 2 (“No voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race or color.”).
100. The VRA defined voting tests or devices as:
[A]ny requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for
voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any
matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any
particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his
qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class.
Voting Rights Act § 4(c).
101. See id. § 4(b). A state or county could be removed from statutory coverage if the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a declaratory judgement stating that
the area had not used racially discriminatory voting procedures in the past five years. See id.
§ 4(a).
102. Id. § 4(a).
103. See id. § 5.
104. Id.
105. See id. § 6(b).
106. See id. §§ 7(a), 9(b). 
107. See id. § 7(b).
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voters from the rolls.108 The Attorney General could also assign
federal examiners to observe polling locations and vote tabulation
procedures “for the purpose of observing whether persons who are
entitled to vote are being admitted to vote ... [and] whether votes
cast by persons entitled to vote [were] being properly tabulated.”109
The VRA even authorized the Department of Justice to test whether
poll taxes were constitutional.110 Through the VRA, Congress es-
tablished an effective system to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment
in states that failed to ensure African Americans access to the
ballot.
The Reconstruction Era began with a promise to integrate Afri-
can Americans to American life in a post-slavery society, but that
promise failed to materialize in the South due to malintent state
actors.111 Nearly one hundred years after the Fifteenth Amendment
provided African Americans the right to vote, the federal govern-
ment enacted the VRA to guarantee and protect African American
suffrage in states that both obstructed and failed to protect that
right.112
The next Part shifts focus to the cybersecurity breach in the 2016
election and examines how states’ voter registration databases and
voting machines are outdated and susceptible to hackers. This Note
will return to the VRA’s social history as a comparison to the cur-
rent cybersecurity issues challenging the states.113
II. AMERICAN ELECTION SYSTEMS AND THE 2016 ELECTION
In June 2016, reporters first informed the American public that
Russian government hackers had infiltrated the Democratic
National Committee’s (DNC) online network.114 One month later,
108. See id. § 7(d).
109. Id. § 8.
110. See id. § 10(b). President Johnson’s administration quickly won this battle. See Harper
v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that a state-imposed poll tax in
Virginia violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
111. See supra Part I.A.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 45, 93-110.
113. See infra Part III.A.
114. Ellen Nakashima, Russian Government Hackers Penetrated DNC, Stole Opposition
Research on Trump, WASH. POST (June 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/russian-government-hackers-penetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-
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WikiLeaks published roughly 20,000 private DNC emails related to
this hack.115 Ultimately, an investigation into this hack uncovered
Russian government attacks on various United States election sys-
tems.116 Part II.A provides a brief timeline explaining how United
States intelligence officials uncovered Russian meddling in the 2016
election and how the United States responded. Part II.B examines
how states failed to adequately secure elections prior to the 2016
election by not updating their voter registration systems and vote
tabulation machines.
A. Security Breach in the 2016 Election
While investigating the Russian government’s cybersecurity at-
tack on the DNC, DHS learned that a Russian company breached
some state election systems prior to the 2016 election.117 At that
time, DHS cautioned all states to check their cybersecurity systems
and request federal assistance if needed.118 In January 2017, the
United States Intelligence Community (USIC) concluded that “Rus-
sian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in
2016 aimed at the [United States] presidential election.”119 Specif-
ically, the USIC determined that Russian intelligence had accessed
multiple states’ and localities’ electoral technology since 2014,120 but
the attempt in 2016 was an “escalation in directness, level of ac-
tivity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations.”121
President Putin disputed these findings and asserted that Russia
trump/2016/06/14/cf006cb4-316e-11e6-8ff7-7b6c1998b7a0_story.html?utm_term=.ce2c19a03
ea8 [https://perma.cc/DU5A-MWKD].
115. Tom Hamburger & Karen Tumulty, WikiLeaks Releases Thousands of Documents
about Clinton and Internal Deliberations, WASH. POST (July 22, 2016), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/22/on-eve-of-democratic-convention-wikileaks-re
leases-thousands-of-documents-about-clinton-the-campaign-and-internal-deliberations/?utm_
term=.59bbd3d312b3 [https://perma.cc/WL6D-G9FE].
116. See infra text accompanying note 117; see also DHS on Election Security, supra note
1.
117. DHS on Election Security, supra note 1.
118. Id.
119. INTELLIGENCE CMTY. ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at ii.
120. See id. at 3.
121. Id. at ii.
1996 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1979
never engaged in election hacking.122 An ongoing investigation into
this matter has led to the indictment of three Russian companies,
twelve Russian citizens, and thirteen Russian nationals for inter-
ference with the 2016 election.123
In response to the USIC’s conclusion, DHS designated election
infrastructure as “critical.”124 This classification provided voting
systems with various federal protections, such as “streamlined ac-
cess to classified threat information sharing, opportunities for added
training[,] and various other tools aimed to help both public and
private entities.”125 DHS deliberately explained that “[t]his desig-
nation [did] not mean a federal takeover, regulation, oversight or
intrusion concerning elections,” but instead “enable[d DHS] to
prioritize ... cybersecurity assistance to state and local election
officials ... who request it.”126
Six months after the USIC published its assessment, a leaked
NSA document revealed that the Russian government directed
a spear-phishing attack against an unnamed American company
that manufactures and services American voting machines.127 Later
that month, it was also reported that Russia breached thirty-nine
122. See Ian Phillips & Vladimir Isachenkov, Putin Denies Russian Hacking, Hails Trump
as ‘Straightforward’, BOS. GLOBE (June 1, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/
2017/06/01/putin-russian-state-has-never-been-involved-hacking/i6uF8GilmoAoZHf93gZAmJ/
story.html [https://perma.cc/L6DP-N6BP]. After some initial confusion, the White House
clarified that it accepted the USIC’s conclusion rather than President Putin’s statement. See
Justin Fishel, White House Disputes that Trump Denied Russia Still Targeting the US, ABC
NEWS (July 18, 2018, 7:51 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-answers-asked-russia-
targeting-us/story?id=56664385 [https://perma.cc/47XU-CC5Q].
123. See Katelyn Polantz & Stephen Collinson, 12 Russians Indicted in Mueller
Investigation, CNN (July 14, 2018, 4:21 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/13/politics/russia-
investigation-indictments/index.html [https://perma.cc/2AJJ-2RTP]; Del Quentin Wilber &
Aruna Viswanatha, Russians Charged with Interfering in U.S. Election, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
16, 2018, 7:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/russians-charged-with-interfering-in-u-s-
election-1518804495 [https://perma.cc/5J7Y-8JST].
124. Press Release, Jeh Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., Statement by Sec'y Jeh Johnson
on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector (Jan. 6,
2017) [hereinafter DHS on Election Infrastructure], https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/
statement-secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical [https://perma.cc/UD
3H-HMTZ].
125. Katie Bo Williams, DHS Designates Election Systems As ‘Critical Infrastructure,’ HILL
(Jan. 6, 2017, 6:10 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/313132-dhs-designates-
election-systems-as-critical-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/A3X9-2S5H].
126. DHS on Election Infrastructure, supra note 124.
127. See Cole et al., supra note 4; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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states’ election systems in the 2016 hack.128 A DHS official rebuffed
this report, testifying that the Russian government only breached
twenty-one states’ election systems and that none of these systems
involved vote tallying.129 Soon thereafter, a published survey stated
that “[one] in [four American] voters said they [would] consider not
voting in upcoming elections over cybersecurity fears.”130
In September 2017, DHS concluded its investigation and notified
the twenty-one affected states.131 In most states, DHS “only saw
preparations for hacking, like scanning to find potential modes for
attack.”132 But two states experienced a more severe breach. In June
2016, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) notified Arizona
election officials that hackers infiltrated the state’s election sys-
tems.133 Although the systems were not compromised, hackers did
steal a Gila County election official’s username and password.134 In
July 2016, Illinois election officials also discovered a cybersecurity
breach.135 While hackers did not alter any data, they conducted “the
first successful compromise of a state voter registration database.”136
It was later estimated that as many as 90,000 voter records were
compromised.137 Hackers accessed Illinois’s voter database, which
128. See Riley & Robertson, supra note 6.
129. See Zapotosky & Demirjian, supra note 5.
130. See CARBON BLACK, supra note 7, at 5.
131. See Sari Horwitz et al., DHS Tells States About Russian Hacking During 2016
Election, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2017, 5:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/dhs-tells-states-about-russian-hacking-during-2016-election/2017/09/22/fd
263a2c-9fe2-11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e_story.html?utm_term=.fd6e3746c0a6 [https://perma.
cc/3EBT-YRKD].
132. Joe Uchill, DHS Tells 21 States They Were Russian Hacking Targets Before 2016
Election, HILL (Sept. 22, 2017), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/351981-dhs-notifies-21-
states-of-they-were-targets-russian-hacking [https://perma.cc/K9QH-FWJE]; see also Callum
Borchers, What We Know About the 21 States Targeted by Russian Hackers, WASH. POST: THE
FIX (Sept. 23, 2017, 5:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/09/23/
what-we-know-about-the-21-states-targeted-by-russian-hackers/?utm_term=.d752a640c2b8
[https://perma.cc/3296-K2HD] (detailing how much is known about the cyberattacks in each
state).
133. See Ellen Nakashima, Russian Hackers Targeted Arizona Election System, WASH.
POST (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-is-
investigating-foreign-hacks-of-state-election-systems/2016/08/29/6e758ff4-6e00-11e6-8365-
b19e428a975e_story.html?utm_term=.56b1791d287a [https://perma.cc/27DG-LPFJ].
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See Riley & Robertson, supra note 6.
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stored voter’s “names, dates of birth, genders, driver’s licenses[,] and
partial Social Security numbers.”138 The FBI suspected Russian
hackers in both the Arizona and Illinois incidents.139 In response,
both states shut down their respective voter registration systems for
one week to investigate these issues and revamp cybersecurity mea-
sures.140 DHS officials concluded that widespread attempts to infil-
trate states’ election systems demonstrated Russian attempts to
meddle in the 2016 election.141
In February 2018, the Director of National Intelligence, Dan
Coates, warned that “Russia’s next target [was] the 2018 midterm
elections.”142 One month later, Congress allocated $380 million “to
improve the administration of elections for Federal office, including
to enhance election technology and make election security improve-
ments.”143 Congress ordered the Election Assistance Commission
(EAC) to disburse these funds within forty-five days, and states
have up to 2023 to spend it.144 The EAC received all state funding
138. Id.
139. See Nakashima, supra note 133.
140. See id.; see also Chuck Goudie & Christine Tressel, How the Russians Penetrated
Illinois Election Computers, ABC7 (July 19, 2018), https://abc7chicago.com/politics/how-the-
russians-penetrated-illinois-election-computers/3778816/ [https://perma.cc/3NDL-7DC7].
141. See Horwitz et al., supra note 131. The United States Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence later affirmed many of these findings. See S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE,
RUSSIAN TARGETING OF ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE DURING THE 2016 ELECTION: SUMMARY OF
INITIAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2018), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/
publications/russia-inquiry [https://perma.cc/52AN-K4UL].
142. Sonam Sheth, Top Intelligence Chiefs Issue a Dire Warning About the Kremlin’s
Ongoing Efforts to Influence the US, Defend Against Trump’s Attacks on the FBI, and Explain
What Happened with a Shady Russian Offering Dirt on Trump, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 13, 2018,
11:53 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/intelligence-chiefs-testify-russia-north-korea-
china-senate-intel-committee-2018-2#the-fbi-informed-the-white-house-last-year-about-the-
rob-porter-allegations-1 [https://perma.cc/P8V6-TRNU].
143. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348. Congress
also allocated approximately $300 million to the FBI to counter Russian cyberattacks. Id.; see
also Dustin Volz, U.S. Spending Bill to Provide $380 Million for Election Cyber Security,
REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fiscal-congress-
cyber/u-s-spending-bill-to-provide-380-million-for-election-cyber-security-idUSKBN1GX2LC
[https://perma.cc/R2J4-FSYJ].
144. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018; Tony Pugh, States Using Election Security
Grants for New Voting Machines that Won’t Be Ready for 2018, MCCLATCHY (June 25, 2018,
12:17 PM), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/election/article213676634.
html [https://perma.cc/HC5T-C94X].
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requests by July 2018 and had dispersed 96 percent of the funds by
August 2018.145
Although the funding is needed, Executive Director for the EAC
Brian Newby described the financing as “not enough to buy new vot-
ing systems and too much for some of the small security things that
need to be done.”146 Further, despite the quick pace at which Con-
gress instructed the EAC to distribute the funds, it was not expected
that the money would necessarily affect election administration in
2018.147 While some states spent the money on hiring election secu-
rity auditors to inspect voting machines, others used it to begin the
long search process for new voting machines.148
The 2016 election cycle served as a wake-up call to state and local
jurisdictions that election cybersecurity desperately needed im-
provement to secure confidence in election results. Both federal and
state authorities worked together to make the 2018 midterms
arguably “the most secure elections [that the United States had]
ever held.”149 This effort appears to have succeeded because DHS did
not observe any successful cybersecurity attacks on Election Day.150
145. Press Release, Election Assistance Comm’n, State & Territories Plan to Spend
Majority of HAVA Grant Funds on Election Security System Upgrades (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.eac.gov/news/2018/08/21/state--territories-plan-to-spend-majority-of-hava-grant-
funds-on-election-security-system-upgrades/ [https://perma.cc/2UTV-U2UM].
146. Bill Lucia, $380 Million of Election Assistance Money Only Goes So Far, ROUTE FIFTY
(July 13, 2018), https://www.routefifty.com/management/2018/07/federal-election-official-ac
knowledges-limits-voting-assistance-funds-states/149731/ [https://perma.cc/8H27-GHHR].
Since these funds were distributed and implemented in some states, Director Christopher
Krebs of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency—the nation’s top cyber-
security official—described the funding as putting states “light years” ahead of where they
were in 2016, but concluding that “there’s certainly more to do.” See Derek B. Johnson, Cyber
Chief Pushes Audits As Key to Election Security, FCW (Feb. 13, 2019), https://fcw.com/articles/
2019/02/13/krebs-hicks-house-homeland-audits.aspx [https://perma.cc/J8DF-MXQ9].
147. See Pugh, supra note 144.
148. See id. (citing South Carolina, Louisiana, and Georgia as three states with paperless
voting machines who would not spend these funds to improve cybersecurity in the 2018
election cycle).
149. David Becker, Opinion, The Midterms Will Be the Most Secure Elections We’ve Ever
Held, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-midterms-
will-be-the-most-secure-elections-weve-ever-held/2018/10/31/e60ff8d6-d930-11e8-9559-
712cbf726d1c_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.12167a8eaba4 [https://perma.cc/ 49E9-
LPFG] (describing improvements in federal cybersecurity monitoring pertaining to elections
and state-run election result audit systems).
150. Jacqueline Thomsen, DHS Has ‘Not Seen’ Successful Cyberattack on Midterm
Elections, HILL (Nov. 7, 2018, 1:39 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/415431-dhs-
has-not-seen-successful-cyberattack-on-midterm-elections [https://perma.cc/DCH7-62MH]
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But one successful election should not be used to declare the
problem solved.151 As the next Section explains, many jurisdictions
still face an uphill battle to reaching optimal election cybersecurity
defense standards, practices, and procedures.
B. Modern Election Systems and Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
The Russian attack on election systems in 2016 demonstrates a
reason to be concerned about cybersecurity in American elections.
While it was not proven that Russian hacking affected the outcome
of the 2016 elections,152 former Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency R. James Woolsey is “confident [that] the Russians will be
back, and that they will take what they have learned ... to attempt
to inflict even more damage in future elections.”153 But this principle
is not exclusive to Russian actors—other malicious independent or
organized actors, domestic or abroad, could also orchestrate a cyber-
attack on an American election.154 Those attacks could—among
other things—focus on voter registration databases or attack voter
machine security.
The cybersecurity concerns presented in the 2016 election focus-
ed on voter registration databases.155 Russian agents reportedly
breached election systems in at least twenty-one states.156 Arizona
(“We’ve not seen, or we’re not aware, of any successful cybersecurity-related compromises of
election infrastructure.”). But see Preston Gralla, A Close Look At Cyber Security During the
Midterm Election, SYMANTEC: ELECTION SECURITY (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.symantec.com/
blogs/election-security/close-look-cyber-security-during-midterm-election [https://perma.cc/
RJQ5-XKC7] (detailing “[s]mall attempts at cyber disruption” pertaining to the 2018 midterm
elections).
151. See Gralla, supra note 150. 
152. See INTELLIGENCE CMTY. ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 8.
153. R. James Woolsey, Foreword to LAWRENCE NORDEN & IAN VANDEWALKER, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, SECURING ELECTIONS FROM FOREIGN INTERFERENCE 1 (2017). Although the
White House has been unclear about its stance on Russian meddling in the 2016 election, see
Fishel, supra note 122, it seems concerned that Russia poses a threat in the future. See
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 24, 2018, 8:50 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1021784726217142273 [https://perma.cc/LM6Y-DMN4].
154. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Hearing Before the
S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 1-2 (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PM6K-6B22] (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence).
155. See Horwitz et al., supra note 131.
156. See Riley & Robertson, supra note 6; Zapotosky & Demirjian, supra note 5.
2019] TRUSTING THE FEDERALISM PROCESS 2001
and Illinois seemed to have experienced the most serious breach-
es,157 but these occurrences may have been more widespread than
is publicly known.158 Russian hackers also attacked voter registra-
tion software companies to gain access to states’ voter databases,
suggesting that the threat extends beyond state-managed sys-
tems.159
By accessing voter registration systems, hackers can manipulate
the databases to accomplish three problematic results. First, hack-
ers could interfere with a voter’s ability to cast a ballot by deleting
a voter from the active list, marking a voter as a felon in states that
do not allow felons to vote, or changing a voter’s party affiliation to
make the voter ineligible in the party’s primary.160 Second, hackers
could manipulate the voter registration systems to affect election
outcomes via mail-in voting.161 Theoretically, hackers could alter
preexisting voter information, or create fictional registered voters,
and funnel mail-in ballots to an address where fraudulent votes
could be cast by mail.162 Experts generally agree that mail-in ballots
are more susceptible to fraudulent voting than in-person voting
because no one observes mail-in voters fill out the ballot.163 Finally,
hackers could simply shut down a voter registration system, or
delete the voter roll entirely, to cause havoc prior to or on Election
Day.164
Meanwhile, prior to the 2016 election, America’s voting machines
and vote tabulation procedures were also vulnerable because they
157. See supra text accompanying notes 131-41.
158. See S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, supra note 141 (finding that Russian-affiliated
cyber actors were in a position to alter or delete voter registration data in a “small number
of states”).
159. See Cole et al., supra note 4.
160. NORDEN & VANDEWALKER, supra note 153, at 16.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See Sami Edge & Sean Holstege, No, Voter Fraud Actually Isn’t a Persistent Problem,
WASH. POST: POST NATION (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2016/09/01/voter-fraud-is-not-a-persistent-problem/?utm_term=.683397715059 [https://
perma.cc/UN7K-E9FK]; see also Christopher Ingraham, 7 Papers, 4 Government Inquiries, 2
News Investigations and 1 Court Ruling Proving Voter Fraud Is Mostly a Myth, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (July 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/09/7-
papers-4-government-inquiries-2-news-investigations-and-1-court-ruling-proving-voter-fraud-
is-mostly-a-myth/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e8ca7015e9ec [https://perma.cc/B6FX-CJS5].
164. See NORDEN & VANDEWALKER, supra note 153, at 16-17.
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were old, faulty, and dangerously under-secured. After poor ballot
designs placed Florida’s 2000 presidential election result in ques-
tion, the federal government pushed states to update their voting
machines.165 Since that federal overhaul, it has been up to the in-
dividual states to decide when to update their machines.166 Some
experts think that voting systems can last between one to two de-
cades, while others suggest that these machines should last no more
than ten years because they function on computer-based technology
that quickly becomes obsolete.167 In 2016, forty-three states used
voting machines that were purchased at least ten years earlier, and
fourteen states used machines that were purchased over fifteen
years earlier.168
There are three clear reasons why states should regularly update
voting machines.169 First, computer-based technology—such as
motherboards, memory cards, and touch screens—fail after years
of wear and tear.170 When voting machines fail on Election Day,
they cause long lines while they are either repaired or replaced.171
Second, many computer-based voting machines currently in use are
based on unsupported and outdated technology, therefore making
them vulnerable to even the most novice hackers.172 In the most
egregious examples, the entire state of Georgia, as well as jurisdic-
tions in California and Ohio, had long-term plans to operate ma-
chines on Windows XP and Windows 2000, even though Microsoft
no longer supports those operating systems.173 Third, it is difficult
to find replacement parts and compatible technology to support
aging voting machines.174 In the 2016 election, forty-three states
and the District of Columbia were using machines that were no
165. See NORDEN & FAMIGHETTI, supra note 10, at 8.
166. See id. at 9.
167. See id. at 8.
168. See id. at 9.
169. See id. at 12-15.
170. See id. at 12-14.
171. See id. at 14.
172. See id. at 15.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 15-17.
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longer in production.175 This makes finding replacement parts ex-
pensive and time consuming.176
Despite knowing that aging voting machines were vulnerable,
many states failed to switch to new machines prior to the 2016
election.177 In 2015, experts estimated that it would cost $580
million to replace the vote tabulation machines that were being used
in forty states, and $3.5 billion to replace the popular touchscreen
voting machines that were being used in thirty states.178 Many state
and local election officials admitted that there was neither political
will, nor available funding, to replace these machines.179 Even when
election officials did have the funds, some purchased replacement
parts for old machines from uncertified online vendors, thus adding
additional security risks.180
But even when states had new voting machines prior to the 2016
election, many had inadequate security protocols to protect and
secure those voting machines. Many states and counties relied on
private companies to store voting machines when the machines
were not in use and depended on these companies to prepare voting
machines for Election Day with software updates.181 Hackers could
easily target these companies prior to Election Day, rather than
local governments, and achieve the same goal. These companies
were targeted—albeit unsuccessfully—prior to the 2016 election.182
Further, in some precincts hackers can tamper with voting ma-
chines inperson because states and localities leave the machines
175. See id. at 15.
176. See id.
177. See id.; see also Michael Wines, Wary of Hackers, States Move to Upgrade Voting
Systems, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/14/us/voting-russians-
hacking-states-.html [https://perma.cc/Y4V4-9E7W].
178. See NORDEN & FAMIGHETTI, supra note 10, at 17 n.102.
179. See Wines, supra note 177.
180. Kate Rabinowitz, Election Security a High Priority—Until it Comes to Paying for New
Voting Machines, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 20, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/
election-security-a-high-priority-until-it-comes-to-paying-for-new-voting-machines [https://
perma.cc/V8KY-XKHT].
181. See HARVARD KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS, THE STATE AND
LOCAL ELECTION CYBERSECURITY PLAYBOOK 12 (2018), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/
default/files/files/publication/StateLocalPlaybook%201.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/24DS-S7LY].
182. Cole et al., supra note 4. Hackers have targeted voting machines prior to Election Day
reaching as far back as South Africa in 1994, and as recently as Ukraine in 2014. See NORDEN
& VANDEWALKER, supra note 153, at 7.
2004 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1979
unguarded after the machines are delivered to the polling sta-
tions.183 Additionally, many states and localities do not have re-
strictions or standards in place to retire voting machines.184 Because
anyone can purchase these machines, a malicious hacker could buy
and study them to learn their vulnerabilities. The hacker could then
use that information to disrupt an election in a state or locality still
using that same machine.
Russian efforts to disrupt the 2016 presidential election demon-
strated that states’ election systems were vulnerable to a security
breach.185 Voter registration databases and voting machines appear
to have been particularly easy targets, and they could serve hackers
as effective tools to disrupt administering elections in the future.186
Even though state officials recognized these obvious gaps in their
election security, their systems remained both outdated and un-
protected on Election Day.187
The next Part analogizes the states’ failure to establish secure
elections with the states’ failure to ensure African Americans access
to the ballot box. It also recognizes challenges to this analogy, and
rebuts those challenges.
III. HOW CONGRESS CAN FORCE STATES TO UPDATE ELECTION
CYBERSECURITY SYSTEMS AND STANDARDS
Thus far, this Note has explained how states failed to protect Af-
rican American voting rights throughout most of American history,
and how the federal government finally intervened to secure African
American suffrage through the VRA.188 Further, this Note described
the Russian cybersecurity attacks on various state election systems
183. See, e.g., Ed Felten, E-Voting Links for Election Day, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Nov. 2,
2010), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2010/11/02/e-voting-links-election-day/ [https://perma.cc/
CK95-UJRJ] (describing a professor’s annual visit to various precincts prior to Election Day
to demonstrate that voting machines were unguarded from tampering).
184. See, e.g., Andrew W. Appel, How I Bought Used Voting Machines on the Internet,
PRINCETON U.: COMPUTER SCI. BLOG (Feb. 8, 2007), https://www.cs.princeton. edu/~appel/avc/
[https://perma.cc/EVM5-CXJ2] (describing how a professor was able to buy retired North
Carolina voting machines that were still utilized in other jurisdictions).
185. See supra Part II.A.
186. See supra Part II.B.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 177-80.
188. See supra Part I.
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during the 2016 election and demonstrated how states’ registration
systems and voting machines were vulnerable to hackers during
that election cycle.189 This Part compares these two events and ex-
plores the boundary of Congress’s authority to target specific states’
cybersecurity procedures in elections. The analogy demonstrates
that Congress has the constitutional authority to force states with
outdated election cybersecurity systems to submit to federal cyber-
security audits. Additionally, this Part addresses potential counter-
arguments to the analogy.
A. Analogizing the VRA with Election Cybersecurity
During the VRA’s construction and enactment, the legislation
faced various federalism-based challenges. When President Lyndon
B. Johnson tasked Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to draft
a new and aggressive voting rights bill, the Attorney General urged
the President to instead consider a constitutional amendment.190
Attorney General Katzenbach worried that the proposed bill
conflicted with federalism principles because the Elections Clause
authorized states, rather than the federal government, to define the
voters’ qualifications.191 Later, during the legislative process, the
bill’s opponents framed their position as standing against federal
government intrusion on states’ rights: “[T]he ultimate impact of the
bill sets a dangerous precedent for unwarranted intrusion of Federal
power into legitimate concerns of State and local governments.”192
States subjected to the VRA’s coverage formula vehemently
criticized the bill as unconstitutionally targeting specific states.193
Even public discourse asked whether the VRA overstepped the
federal government’s constitutional authority.194 The Supreme Court
189. See supra Part II.
190. See MAY, supra note 78, at 50-51.
191. See id.
192. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 439, at 67-68, 71 (1965) (statement of Rep. Edwin E. Willis). 
193. E.g., Voting Rights Senate Hearings, supra note 95, at 705-06 (statement of Robert Y.
Button, Att’y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Va.) (“[T]he bill manifestly does not even attempt
to achieve [an end to racial discrimination] on an impartial, uniform, nationwide basis as it
should ... but only snipes at the problem piecemeal.”). 
194. See, e.g., Editorial, An Immoral Law, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1965, at 14, PROQUEST,
Doc. No. 133069038 (“If it is immoral, as the President says, to deprive a qualified citizen of
his right to vote ‘under color of a literacy test,’ is it moral to violate one part of the
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would ultimately consider the VRA’s constitutionality based on a
federalism challenge.195
The day following the VRA’s enactment, seven states and twenty-
seven counties were brought within the VRA’s coverage formula.196
South Carolina was one of the covered states.197 The federal gov-
ernment immediately mandated that South Carolina suspend its
literacy test,198 and eventually Attorney General Katzenbach as-
signed federal examiners to two South Carolina counties.199
Additionally, South Carolina failed to report a change in its polling
locations’ operating hours, thereby violating the VRA’s preclearance
provision.200 South Carolina challenged the law,201 claiming that the
VRA “exceed[ed] the powers of Congress and encroach[ed] on an
area reserved to the States by the Constitution.”202 Further, South
Carolina argued that the coverage formula violate[d] the Due
Process Clause because it “violated the principle of the equality of
States.”203 Ultimately, the Court upheld the VRA as “a valid means
for carrying out ... the Fifteenth Amendment.”204
At the outset, the Court outlined the unique circumstances under
which Congress enacted the VRA.205 It specifically highlighted the
discriminatory purpose behind southern states’ constitutional
conventions in the 1890s, and how the mid-twentieth century civil
rights bills failed to stop race-based voter discrimination.206 The
Court even mentioned the protests in Selma, Alabama as demon-
strating that race-based disenfranchisement, not political apathy,
barred African Americans from the ballot box.207 Within this
Constitution under the color of upholding another which is in no wise in conflict?”).
195. See infra text accompanying note 202.
196. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 318 (1966). 
197. Id.
198. See id. at 319.
199. See id. at 322.
200. See id. at 320.
201. Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia joined South Carolina’s
lawsuit. See id. at 307-08 n.2.
202. Id. at 323. 
203. Id. South Carolina also claimed that the VRA violated the Bill of Attainder Clause and
separation of powers principles, which the Court promptly rejected. See id. at 323-24.
204. Id. at 337 (emphasis added).
205. See id. at 308, 310-15.
206. Id. at 310-11, 310-11 n.9, 313-14.
207. Id. at 315.
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context, the Court recognized that Congress enacted the VRA to
address “an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetu-
ated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and
ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”208 It was under “these
unique circumstances ... [that] Congress responded in a permissibly
decisive manner.”209
The Court explained its reasoning in two steps. First, the Court
reviewed precedent Fifteenth Amendment caselaw.210 Although the
Court acknowledged that states have the power to administer lo-
cal elections, the Court found that the Fifteenth Amendment “su-
persedes contrary exertions of state power.”211 Therefore, when the
States exercised their election administration power to block African
Americans from the voting booth, the Fifteenth Amendment au-
thorized Congress to intervene.212
Second, the Court compared Congress’s express powers against
the state’s reserved powers under the McCulloch test:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional.213
As applied to the VRA, Congress’s power under the Fifteenth
Amendment was “complete in itself, [could] be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledge[d] no limitations, other than [as]
prescribed in the constitution.”214 Through this reasoning, the Court
held that Congress justifiably tailored its election administration
oversight to specific jurisdictions because the Fifteenth Amendment
placed few limitations on Congress.215
208. Id. at 309.
209. Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
210. See id. at 324-25.
211. Id. at 325.
212. Id. (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)).
213. Id. at 358 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis
omitted)).
214. Id. at 327 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)).
215. See id.
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Shifting to the election cybersecurity context, those most worried
about federal intervention in state election administration cite
federalism concerns similar to those used by VRA skeptics and
opponents.216 After DHS uncovered Russia’s cyberattack on state
election systems prior to the 2016 election, DHS offered cybersecuri-
ty assistance to protect each state’s vote tabulation and direction
results.217 But Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp, the State’s
chief election official, denied DHS’s offer over a concern that federal
assistance would lead to oversight in Georgia’s state-run elections.218
Later, when DHS declared election systems “critical infrastructure”
in order to funnel federal funding to states and address these issues,
Secretary Kemp criticized the designation as “a federal overreach
into a sphere constitutionally reserved for the states.”219 Connecti-
cut’s chief election officer, Secretary of State Denise Merrill, best
articulated the critics’ concerns: “Elections have always been run
and organized by the states .... [and] there has always been a fear
that there would be federal intervention that would not recognize
differences among the states.”220
In spite of these concerns, if Congress were to enact legislation
that required states with outdated election cybersecurity systems
to submit to federal cybersecurity audits, akin to the VRA’s cover-
age formula,221 then Congress could justify it under a Katzenbach
analysis.
The Katzenbach Court first contextualized the VRA within the
unique circumstances that were present at the VRA’s enactment.222
Thus, Congress would look for a similar set of unique circumstances
in the election cybersecurity context. Congress would likely first
acknowledge that various states had not updated their voting
216. See supra text accompanying notes 190-95, 202.
217. Aliya Sternstein, At Least One State Declines Offer for DHS Voting Security, NEXTGOV
(Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2016/08/some-swing-states-decline-
dhs-voting-security-offer/131037 [https://perma.cc/R24E-5ZE2].
218. See id.
219. Tim Starks, DHS Labels Elections As ‘Critical Infrastructure’, POLITICO (Jan. 6,
2017, 6:39 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/elections-criticalinfrastructure-home
land-security-233304 [https://perma.cc/9DQH-VKDR].
220. Eric Geller, Elections Security: Federal Help or Power Grab?, POLITICO (Aug. 28,
2016, 7:09 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/election-cyber-securitygeorgia-227475
[https://perma.cc/G49B-HABA].
221. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 110, § 4(b)-(c), 73 Stat. 437, 438-39.
222. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-15 (1965).
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machines in over ten to fifteen years.223 Then in 2016, Russian
hackers attacked between twenty-one and thirty-nine states’ elec-
tion systems.224 At least Illinois’s and Arizona’s systems were suc-
cessfully infiltrated, and one spear-phishing attack was perpetrated
against a third-party voting machine provider.225 Congress would
also want to highlight states’ election cybersecurity activity before
and after the 2016 election.
Prior to the election, even though states and local jurisdictions
recognized a need to update their voter registration systems and
voting machines, holdouts declined to act either due to budgetary
concerns or a lack of political will.226 Soon after the 2016 election,
when the federal government made assistance available, some
election officials declined this offer due to federalism concerns.227
Congress would want to emphasize the appearance that the only
changes being made in some states and jurisdictions are due to
congressional grant money,228 and those funds are still not enough
to address the plethora of election cybersecurity concerns across the
country.229 Thus, these unique circumstances—a reliance on
outdated voting machines and registration systems, a threat of
future election interference, and the reluctance to upgrade voting
machines—provide Congress the justification for targeted precision
akin to the VRA.
The analogy continues under the Katzenbach analysis by re-
viewing precedent Elections Clause caselaw to determine how far
Congress’s authority extends.230 Overall, the Court has interpreted
the Elections Clause to provide Congress sweeping authority to
regulate the time, place, and manner of elections.231 Even though
223. NORDEN & FAMIGHETTI, supra note 10, at 9; see also Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308-15.
224. Riley & Robertson, supra note 6; Zapotosky & Demirjian, supra note 5.
225. See Cole et al., supra note 4; Riley & Robertson, supra note 6; Zapotosky & Demirjian,
supra note 5.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 177-80, 223.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 216-20.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 143-48.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47, 173.
230. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325-26 (1966).
231. See, e.g., Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 71 n.2 (1997) (holding that Congress may
override state regulations with uniform election rules); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651,
660-62 (1884) (holding that states have the power to regulate election administration until
Congress acts); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 384-85 (1879) (holding that Congress’s power
to regulate elections overrides the state’s regulation when the practices conflict). For an
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states manage elections, Congress has the power to modify or
displace any state election regulation.232 Recently, the Court
articulated this doctrine in a clear statement: “[T]he States’ role in
regulating congressional elections—while weighty and worthy of
respect—has always existed subject to the express qualification that
it ‘terminates according to federal law.’”233 Thus, the Court would
likely assess Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause as a
plenary power.
Finally, in concluding the Katzenbach analysis, Congress’s action
would satisfy the McCulloch test as legitimate and within Con-
gress’s authority.234 As suggested earlier, Congress’s authority is
vast within the scope of the Elections Clause.235 In regulating and
auditing election cybersecurity systems, Congress would be legis-
lating the manner of elections.236 Hence, if Congress set a minimum
cybersecurity standard, then the states would have to adjust their
procedures to meet this threshold without exception. For example,
in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., the Court held
that a federal statute that articulated voter registration form
standards superseded a state law that modified the same form.237
Further, Congress’s federal election cybersecurity audit would serve
as an enforcement mechanism to carry out Congress’s cybersecurity
standards. Because the Court treats the Elections Clause as a
plenary power, a congressional statute defining election cyber-
security standards that is enforced through a federal audit would
likely satisfy the McCulloch test because it is “within the scope” of
Congress’s constitutional power to regulate the manner of
elections.238
In sum, Congress’s oversight—through the VRA—of states that
disenfranchised African Americans demonstrates that Congress can
overview on Elections Clause jurisprudence, see Robert A. Kengle, To Accept or To Reject:
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, the Elections Clause, and the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993, 57 HOW. L.J. 759, 761-67 (2014).
232. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805-06 (1995).
233. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257 (2013) (citing
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001)). 
234. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326-27 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 421 (1819)).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 231-33.
236. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310, 337.
237. 133 S. Ct. at 2257.
238. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326-27 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421).
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both set election cybersecurity standards and force those states
with outdated election cybersecurity systems to submit to federal
audits. The unique circumstances in each situation justify targeted
congressional oversight of specific states.239 Additionally, the Fif-
teenth Amendment and the Elections Clause provide Congress the
constitutional authority to intervene in state election administration
in both circumstances.240 Because the Court considers these con-
stitutional powers to be so comprehensive, Congress’s actions satisfy
the McCulloch test, and thus satisfy the Katzenbach analysis.241
B. Challenges to the Analogy
When assessing the analogy made in Part III.A, critics may
question it on a few points. This Section identifies and answers two
notable counterarguments.
1. Shelby County and the VRA’s Coverage Formula
Critics may argue that the analogy fails because it is based on
bad law. In Shelby County v. Holder, the Court struck down the
VRA’s coverage formula.242 The Court recognized that Congress es-
tablished the coverage formula to address race-based voter dis-
crimination in 1965, but the formula had not changed in nearly fifty
years.243 Challengers may argue that the analogy is unsuccessful
because it is so closely tied to a historical example that proved to be
unconstitutional.244
The Shelby County decision certainly affects Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence moving forward245 and serves
239. See supra text accompanying notes 205-09, 222-29.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 210-12, 230-33.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 213-15, 234-38.
242. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625-27 (2013).
243. Id.
244. See id. at 2618, 2625-27.
245. See, e.g., Jon Greenbaum et al., Shelby County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes
Irrational, 57 HOW. L.J. 811, 814 (2014) (asserting that the Court incorrectly applied Fifteenth
Amendment precedent in deciding Shelby County); Franita Tolson, The Constitutional
Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 381-82, 384 (2014) (arguing
that preclearance is still constitutional under the Reconstruction Amendments).
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as a commentary on statutory shelf life,246 but it does not undercut
the VRA’s validity as it was enacted. The Court noted in Shelby
County that Congress justifiably enacted the coverage formula in
1965 but determined that this particular provision could not be
rationalized in 2013.247 The Court reasoned that the coverage for-
mula was unconstitutional because it lacked those unique circum-
stances (such as literacy tests and low voter registration in African
American communities) that existed when Congress wrote the
formula.248
Although the Shelby County Court gutted the coverage formula,
its holding does not weaken the comparison to election cybersecurity
concerns. The analogy relies on the VRA to demonstrate Congress’s
authority to legislate oversight over specific states under unique
circumstances, rather than stand as good law. For example, if
Congress enacted legislation like the VRA that targeted states with
outdated election cybersecurity systems and successfully compelled
those states to update those systems through a federal audit, then
the Shelby County decision may later become persuasive caselaw to
strike down the cybersecurity coverage formula because the unique
circumstances that permitted Congress to enact targeted federal
oversight onto specific states would no longer exist. But in the pres-
ent context, the Shelby County holding does not apply because
Congress has yet to employ any oversight over states regarding elec-
tion cybersecurity, let alone targeted oversight compelling technol-
ogy upgrades.249 Therefore, even though the Court gutted the VRA
coverage formula in Shelby County, that holding does not affect the
analogy presented here.
246. See Allison Orr Larsen, Do Laws Have a Constitutional Shelf Life?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 59,
61 (2015) (using Shelby County to determine when a court may find that a statute is nullified
due to passage of time and changed circumstances).
247. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2627.
248. Id. at 2627-29, 2631.
249. See Derek Hawkins, The Cybersecurity 202: Why the Latest Election Security Bill Is
Stalled in Congress, WASH. POST: POWER POST (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2018/08/31/the-cybersecurity-202-why-the-
latest-election-security-bill-is-stalled-in-congress/5b8829fb1b326b3f31919eaa/?noredirect=on&
utm_term=.ea3d3f540898 [https://perma.cc/6P6N-BMS3].
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2. Malfeasance Versus Nonfeasance: Intent’s Role Within the
Analogy
Commentators may also criticize this analogy as unfairly
comparing states’ intent to disenfranchise African Americans with
not updating election systems. Critics would be correct to identify a
distinction between how states intentionally denied African Ameri-
cans’ access to the ballot box and how states are failing to provide
voters secure elections. The states’ obstructionist tactics prior to the
VRA are not equivalent to a state legislature that is indifferent to
old voting machines, wants to enhance voter registration systems
but cannot afford the change, or is willing to upgrade their election
technology but distrusts federal involvement.250 Even in the most
shocking example where states are using systems with outdated and
unsupported software, there is no evidence that states are intention-
ally using old machines to reach a mischievous goal.251 Therefore,
challengers may argue that the analogy fails because the states’
intent in each circumstance is consequentially different.
Although this distinction is accurate, the analogy hinges on the
unique circumstances in these examples rather than the demon-
strated intent. In the VRA example, States obstructed African
American access to the ballot box through structural barriers and
scare tactics.252 The Katzenbach Court specifically recounted the
States’ race-based voter discrimination history prior to upholding
the VRA as a valid exercise of constitutional authority.253 Even the
Shelby County Court, which struck down the coverage formula,
recognized that the VRA was only able to target federal oversight
onto specific states due to these unique circumstances.254 In the
election cybersecurity context, even after Russian hackers infil-
trated state election systems, many states still did not act to update
their machines and systems.255 At least some states and juris-
dictions acted only after Congress offered funding for election
250. Compare Part I.A-B, with Part II.B.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 177-80.
252. See supra Part I.
253. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-15, 324-29 (1966).
254. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627-29 (2013).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 217-19.
2014 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1979
cybersecurity updates without federal oversight.256 In the wake of
such a serious threat, the states’ inaction presents Congress with
another unique circumstance to justify and necessitate targeted
federal oversight.
This analogy is not meant to compare the states’ intent in each
example, nor does the analogy rely on evident malfeasance. Instead,
the analogy relies on the demonstrated unique circumstances in
each situation. Since the comparison survives this distinction be-
tween function and intent, the analogy still holds.
CONCLUSION
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court held that Congress
had the constitutional authority to enact the VRA.257 Even though
the VRA treated some states differently than others, the Court
found this disparate treatment was constitutional due to “unique
circumstances.”258 Should Congress decide to enact legislation that
both sets new election cybersecurity standards and enforces those
standards through targeted federal oversight of those states with
outdated election systems, then Congress’s action would be consti-
tutional because analogous unique circumstances exist today.259
In response to Russia’s cybersecurity attack on the 2016 election,
former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified
that “[i]f there has ever been a clarion call for vigilance and action
against a threat to the very foundation of our democratic political
system, this episode is it.”260 In July 2017, after it was revealed that
various state election systems were breached,261 one in four
American voters said they would consider not voting in upcoming
elections over cybersecurity fears.262 While some states are acting to
secure American democracy and improve voter confidence, many
states lag behind.263 The states that fail to update their election
systems need more cybersecurity expertise and more funding to
256. See Sternstein, supra note 217.
257. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337.
258. Id. at 334-35 (emphasis added).
259. See supra Part III.A.
260. NORDEN & VANDEWALKER, supra note 153, at 6.
261. See supra text accompanying note 127.
262. See CARBON BLACK, supra note 7, at 5.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 175, 177, 181-84.
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complete desired upgrades.264 Without the federal government’s
intervention, it seems inevitable that further cybersecurity breaches
will lead to a more anxious and uncertain electorate.
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